In an important contribution Bagwell 1995] showed that the value of commitment tends to vanish if the observability of commitments is subject to an arbitrarily small distortion, due to the possibility of misunderstanding or communication error. Bagwell's observation calls into question the many stage games that have been exceedingly popular in economics, especially in theoretical industrial organization.
Introduction
Many games in economics are sequential games where players make decisions in a given sequence. These decision are usually taken to be irreversible; hence, some ability to make reliable commitments is assumed. Examples abound especially in the eld of theoretical industrial organization. The simplest cases are games with a Stackelberg \leader" and \follower" structure, and the many simultaneous move stage games that have been exceedingly popular in economics.
As was already pointed out by Schelling 1960 ] the ability to make irreversible commitments in and by itself has no value. Assuming simple games of complete information he showed that the power to make commitmentments is completely ine ective if these commitments cannot be observed by rival players.
Recently Bagwell 1995] further advanced our understanding of the role of observability in commitment games. Assuming a simple game of complete information Bagwell showed that commitment already becomes completely ine ective if the observation of commitments at earlier stages of the game is subject to a arbitrarily small noise, due to the possibility of misunderstanding or communication error. 1 Bagwell's result calls into question the use of the exceedingly popular stage games in economics. However, before disposing of the child together with the bathwater one should explore variations of Bagwell's setup and assess the robustness of Bagwell result.
In a rst assessment of the robustness of Bagwell's result Hurkens and van Damme 1994] argued that it is the focus on pure strategy equilibria that drives Bagwell's result. Under certain regularity assumptions Bagwell's game has also mixed strategy equilibria of which one preserves the value of commitment and converges to the unique equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous move game with perfect observability if the distortion tends to vanish. Therefore, if one has a convincing reason to favor that particular equilibrium, the value of commitment is restored. Hurkens and van Damme propose a new equilibrium selection principle that achieves precisely this goal.
However, this argument is not entirely convincing. Given their regularity assumption, each pure strategy equilibrium is strict, whereas mixed strategy equilibria are necessarily weak. Therefore, all standard equilibrium selection principles select the equilibrium in which the rst mover advantage has vanished. The present paper takes a di erent approach to rescue the value of commitment. 2 We assert that Bagwell's result is driven by the exclusion of other informational imperfections, such as \trembles" in players' execution of actions or payo uncertainty. We add these distortions to Bagwell's model and show that the game then has an unique pure strategy equilibrium that converges to the unique equilibrium outcome of the simultaneous move game with perfect observability, if the noise associated with communication error is is small relative to the probability of trembles or if there are many kinds of imperfections. Suppose, player 1, the \Stackelberg{leader", moves rst, and his action is perfectly observed by player 2. The unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome then is (S; S) to which we refer as to the \Stackelberg outcome". Of course, this is also the unique sequential equilibrium and it is trembling hand perfect.
An Example
Consider a perturbed version of this game, and rst assume that the possibility of misunderstanding or communication error is the only imperfection, as in Bagwell. Then, the unique pure strategy equilibrium outcome corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium outcome (C; C) of the simultaneous{ move game which we call the \Cournot outcome". For, suppose the observed signal deviates from the assumed equilibrium action, then player 2 has to conclude that this is due to a communication error | there is no other distortion. Player 2 thus completely ignores the observed signal. He always chooses his best response against 1 0 s equilibrium action | no matter which signal he observes. Consequently, player 1 loses his rst mover advantage and the \Cournot outcome" (C; C) is the unique pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium outcome.
However, suppose player 1 might make a mistake in the execution of the preferred action. Then, an observed deviation from player 1 0 s equilibrium action is not necessarily due to a communication error. If player 2 believes that trembles are more likely than communication error, he will attach probability 1=2 or more to the event that the observed signal coincides with 1 0 s actually executed action. In that case, in the simple 2 2 game, player 2 plays the Stackelberg{follower equilibrium strategy and chooses S if S was observed and C if C was observed.
Signal and Trembling Hand Imperfection
Consider a sequential game where player 1, the Stackelberg{leader, has the nite action space X with elements x, and player 2, the Stackelberg{follower, the nite action space Y with elements y. Assumption 1 (Regularity) Let u i : X Y ! R denote the payo functions of players i = 1; 2. We assume: u i (x; y) 6 = u i (x;ŷ) 8(x; y) 6 = (x;ŷ):
There are two kinds of imperfections. Due to trembles, player 1 0 s actual choice x 1 is a realization of the random variable X 1 and di ers with positive probability from his equilibrium action x 0 . Player 2 neither observes x 0 nor x 1 . Instead, he observes the realization x 2 of the random variable X 2 . 
By (2){ (3), player 1 chooses any action x 1 2 X with positive probability | given his equilibrium action x 0 , and any signal x 2 2 X can result from any x 1 2 X. In this game, a pure strategy for player 1 is simply an action x 2 X, and a pure strategy for player 2 is a function ! from signals X 2 to actions, so that the action y 2 Y taken when signal x 2 is observed is y = !(x 2 ).
In order to derive the equilibrium outcome it is useful to de ne the best{ response correspondences of the associated game without any imperfection. Let R 2 (x) denote the set of y values that maximize u 2 (x; y) over player 2 0 s action space Y , and de ne R 1 (y) similar for Player 1. Notice that R 1 (y) and R 2 (x) are single valued by the regularity assumption (1) .
By the regularity assumption (1), player 2 completely ignores the signal X 2 , and always chooses his best respond against 1 0 s equilibrium action x 0 if he concludes that the payo relevant x 1 takes almost with certainty the same value as x 0 | no matter which signal x 2 is observed. In this case player 2 0 s equilibrium strategy is ! (x 2 ) = R 2 (x 0 ) for all x 2 2 X. However, player 2 reacts to the observed signal just as the \Stackelberg follower" of the associated game without any imperfection, and ! (x 2 ) = R 2 (x 2 ) for all x 2 2 X, if he instead concludes that the payo relevant x 1 coincides always almost with certainty with the signal X 2 .
Player 2 uses all available information. He observes x 2 , and he can infer 1 0 s equilibrium action x 0 . Therefore Lemma 1 There exists an > 0 such that (i) PrfX 1 = k j x 2 = i; x 0 = kg 1 ? 8i 2 X; (4) implies that ! (x 2 ) = R 2 (x 0 ) 8x 2 2 X; (5) is player 2 0 s equilibrium strategy, whereas (ii) PrfX 1 = i j x 2 = i; x 0 = kg 1 ? 8i 2 X: (6) implies that ! (x 2 ) = R 2 (x 2 ) 8x 2 2 X;
is player 2 0 s equilibrium strategy.
Consider the limit where both kinds of imperfections vanish. Let P mn be a stochastic matrix de ned on the state space X (ii) Condition (9) implies 
The rest of the proof is similar to (i) and therefore omitted. Just as in the example, we call the equilibrium outcomes of the associated simultaneous{move game without any imperfection \Cournot outcomes", and we call the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential{move game without any imperfection the \Stackelberg outcome". 
and the set of equilibrium outcomes of the perturbed game coincides with the set of \Cournot outcomes".
(ii) Suppose (9) 
Finally, the probability that the observed signal x 2 coincides with 1 0 s equilibrium action x 0 tends to one as imperfections tend to vanish. Hence, lim P 10 ;P 21 !I Prfy = R 2 (x 0 )g = 1, and the equilibrium outcome of the perturbed game converges in probability to the \Stackelberg outcome".
By Proposition 1(i) the \Cournot outcome" is the unique pure strategy equilibrium outcome if there is only signal imperfection, P 10 = I as assumed in Bagwell (1995) . However, by Proposition 1(ii) this outcome is generally not trembling hand perfect.
Many Imperfections
Denote player 1 0 s equilibrium action by x T?t , the payo relevant variable by X T?1 and the signal by X T . Then, a pure strategy for player 2 is a function ! from signals X T to actions, so that the action y 2 Y taken when signal x T is observed is y = !(x T ). Further, in the associated sequential move game without any imperfections player 2 0 s equilibrium strategy is R 2 (x T ), whereas it is R 2 (x T?t ) in the associated simultaneous move game. 
There N denotes the number of elements of the set X, and b := min n b n;n?1 where b n;n?1 := min i;j p n;n?1 ij .
Proof ( (2) Second we prove condition (40). Notice that
